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IIYTRODUCITON
In this paper I shall show that the DRT (Discourse Representation Theory) treatment of temporal
anaphoral can be formalized within a version of Montague Semantics that is based on classical
type logic. This emulation has at least two purposes. In the first place it may serve as one more
illustration of the general point that although there aze several different frameworks for semantical
analysis in the market today, each with its own special rhetoric and technical set-up, we often
find on closer examination that these approaches are much less different than some of their pro-
ponents want us to believe.2 The frameworks that are under consideration here, DRT and
Montague Grammar, may both profit from knowing where exactly they differ and where they
agree and in this paper it is shown that they do not necessarily differ in their treatment of temporal
phenomena. Our reformulation also shows that we may be able to get rid ofthe ]evel of discourse
representations that is characteristic of DRT. Since we can express large parts of DRT in
Montague Grammar and since Montague Grammar makes no essential use of a level that is
intermediate between syntax and interpretation, we may conclude that we are not forced to adopt
such an extra level. It is possible to make the same predictions while assuming less entities. If
nothing compels us to assume the existence of representations, we should apply Occam's razor to
trim them away.
The second purpose of our reformalization is to extend the DRT analysis of tense to the sub-
clausal level. In the DRT approach whole clauses aze taken as atomic while in our set-up it wiii be
possible to study how the meaning of an expression is built from the meanings of its parts, how
the meanings of those parts are built from the meanings of other expressions, and so on, down to
the level of single words. Languages can build an infinity of ineanings from a finite stock and it
seems that we can account for this only by accepting some building block theory of ineaning.3 A
theory of tense should describe what the temporal operators contribute to the meaning of the
sentences and texts they occur in.
This is not the first paper that fuses DRT and Montague Semantics. For example Rooth
[ 1987], who bases himself upon Barwise [ 1987], gives a Montagovian reanalysis of the DRT
treatment of nominal anaphora and Groenendijk 8c Stokhof [ 1990] for the same purpose develop
a system callec~ Dynamic Montague Grammaz (DMG), a generalization oftheir Dynamic Predicate
Logic (DPL; Groenendijk 8c Stokhof [ 1991 ]). But in this paper I'll use a system of dynamic se-
mantics that I have formulated in Muskens [ 1991 ], a theory that, even though it borrows many
1 As exemplified in Kamp [1979], Hinrichs [1981, 1986], Kamp 8i Rohrer [1983] and Partee [1984].
2 For another illustration of this point see Muskens [1989a], or better, Muskens [1989b], in which I emulate an
early version of Situation Semantics within Montague Grammar.
3 This in itself dces not entail that we must embrace the strict compositionality that is the norm in Montague
Grammar, ofcourse.
2
ideas from DPL, uses classicaJ logic only.4 Standard DMG is based on a highly complicated
logic, and it is here too that I want to apply Occam's razor. Logics ought not to be multiplied ex-
cept from necessity. In order to keep things as simple as I can, I shall not make any use of the
devilish confetti of boxes, cups, caps and tense operators that we find in Montague's IL and I
shall also refrain from using the `state switchers', the `ups' and `downs', the special `quantifiers'
(that are no quantifiers in the usual sense) etc. that are to be found in DMG. All these are
redundant and we can stick to ordinary higher order logic (with lambdas). The structure that is
needed to get a dynamic system can be obtained by using axioms. There is a price to be paid
though: in general our formulae will be relatively long. Since we restrict ourselves to classical
type theory our formulae will have to display all information that in specialized logics can be
encoded in the system itself. On the whole, however, I think that the much greater transparency
of classical logic in practice far outweighs any abbreviatory advantages that can be obtained by
complicating the logic.s
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section I'll sketch a general picture of
the dynamic interpretation of discourse. According to this picture a text acts upon its reader much
in the same way as a computer program acts upon the machine that it runs on, bringing him from
one state to another and changing the values of certain variables he is keeping track of. The ax-
ioms that I have just referred to model this change and are given in section 3. The resulting sys-
tem provides us with the tools that we need for our purposes: on the one hand the axioms enable
us to deal with dynamic phenomena and to take a computational approach to natural language se-
mantics, while on the other the availability of lambdas allows us to build up meanings composi-
tionally in the usual Montagovian manner. That Discourse Representation Theory can really be
emulated in classical logic in this way is shown in section 4 where this theory is embedded into
our system, both in a direct way and via an embedding into a version of the Quantificational
Dynamic Logic that is used in the study ofcomputation. Quantificational Dynamic Logic too can
be embedded into our type ]ogic enriched with axioms.
These embeddings are not given for their technical interest primarily, but for the light that they
shed on our subsequent treatment of two fragments of English. In section 5 I give the first of
these. It contains nominal anaphora; and the section is in fact a quick reheatsal of the theory that
was given in Muskens [ 1991 ]. For our second fragment, however, we need some more structure
and in section 6 a basic ontology of eventualities and periods of time is developed. At that point
the ground will be prepared for our treatment of temporal anaphora in section 7. The treatment
will combine insights from Reichenbach [1947], the DRT tradition and Montague Grammar.
4 I work in a many-sorted version of the logic in Church [1940] here. For the two-sorted variant see Gallin
[1975 ]; a generalization to a type logic with an azbitrary finite number of basic types is trivial.
S I think this practical reason to prefer ordinary logic is much more important than any theoretical consideration.
Logicians should note however that ILdces not have the diamond property: Friedman 8c Warren [1980] give the
following example. Consider the term .ix (.ly (~y - f(x ))x )c , where x and y are variables of some type a, c
is a constant of that type and f is a vaziable of type ( a(sa )). Two reductions are possible. We can reduce to the
term .~y(-y - f( c))c which cannot be reduced any futher, but we can also reduce the inner redex in order to ob-
tain ~ix (~ x- f(x ))c. This term neither can be simplified any further. This means that in IL a choice which
simplification to make first may crucially matter for the result.
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2. CHANGING THE CONTEXT
The reader of a text must keep track of a list of items. While he is reading, the values of these
items may shift. For example, in the first sentence of the short dialogue in (1) below (an ex-
change between a Cop and a Robber) the reference time shifts several times, so that the Robber's
purchase of the gun, his walking to the bank and his entering the bank are interpreted as occur-
ring in succession. At the turn of the dialogue, the speaker becomes the addressee and the ad-
dressee becomes speaker, so that the words `I' and `you' are interpreted correctly. Moreover,
the two indefinite noun phrases in the first sentence each create a discourse referent that can be
picked up at later times by pronouns or definites. (Anaphoric linkage is represented by coindex-
ing here.)
(1) -You bought a 1 gun, walked to a2 bank and entered it2.
i j k
-But I didn't use thel gun or rob the2 bank.
1
At each point in the text the reader may be thought to be in a certain contextual state; 6 in each
contextual state items like reference time, speaker, addressee, various discourse referents and so
on have certain values. We may thus identify these context items with functions that take states as
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Suppose that our reader is in some state i when he starts to read dialogue (1). Suppose also that
at this stage some initial reference time t~ is given and that it is settled that speaker and addressee
are the Cop and the Robber respectively. Now reading a small portion of the text causes the
reader's list ofitems to change. Just after the word gun has been processed, the reference time R
has moved forward and a discourse referent for agun has been stored. So now the reader is in a
state j that differs from i in the two respects that R has shifted to some time~ t2 just after t~
and that some gun (a Smith 8c Wesson, say) is stored in a discourse marker v1.8 A bit later,
when the word bank is read, the reference time has moved to a period oftime t3 just after t2 and
some bank (say the ABN bank at the Vijzelgracht in Amsterdam) is now the value of a discoutse
marker v2. So at this point the reader may be in a state k such that R(k) - t3 and v2 (k) -
~ Compare the `conversational score' in Lewis [ 1979].
~ In section 7 below the point of reference R will range over eventualities.
g The value of v~ in state i is unimportant. We may either assume that vl is undefined for state i, or that it
assumes some special dummy value, or that its value is completely arbitrary. Technically we take the last option.
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ABN. The other items remain unchanged, so that speaker(k) s speaker(j )- Cop, v~ (k) -
v~ (j)- Sd'iW and addressee ( k) s addressee (j)- Robber.
At the start of the second sentence the values for speaker and addressee are swapped, so that
our reader is now in a state 1 such that speaker (1) - Robber and addressee (1) - Cop. The in-
terpretation of the VP entered it has caused the reference time to move again, so that R(1) - t~
for some stretch of time t~ just after t3 ; the other items remain unaltered.
Note that we must view the interpretation process as highly non-deterministic if we want to
model it in this way. If we allow the reader only a single list of items we must allow him many
choices as to which objects he is going to store as the values for these items. For example, our
reader has chosen some particular Smith 8z Wesson to store as the value for the discourse referent
connected with a gvn, but of course he might have taken any gun he liked; he might have chosen
another value for the referent of a bank as well. So a reader who starts reading (1) being in state i
does not need to end up in state 1 at the turn of the dialogue, although he may be in that state
then. The state that the reader is in at a given point in the text does not depend functionally on
preceding states. Given an input state, the processing of a text may lead to many different output
states. We identify the meaning of a text with the binary relation consisting of all tuples (i, j)
such that starting from state i after interpreting the text the reader may be in state j.
There is an analogy between texts and computer programs here that should be pointed out.
Just like the evaluation ofa text causes the values in a list of contextual items to change, running
a program causes the values that are assigned to the program's variables to be altered. Our con-
textual states correspond to program states, and our contextual items correspond to the variables
in a progr~m. Although it is true that programs on an actual computer are detenninistic-it is al-
ways completely decided what action will come next-program semanticists have found it useful
to consider nondetenninistic programs as well. These nondetenninistic programs allow the ma-
chine to choose which of two actions it wants to perform, or to choose how many times it wants
to iterate a given action.
3. THE LOGIC OF CHANGE
Let's formalize our talk about state change within the Theory ofTypes. We can assume that states
are primitive objects (type s), and that our contextual items are functions that take states as argu-
ments. Consequently, contextual items (or, stores ) have a type sa, where a is the type of the
values to be stored. Let's agree to have only a finite set of types a that the values of stores can
have and let's call this set O. In the sections to follow, O will be the four element set { e, r, E,
w}, where e is the type of individuals, r is the type of periods of time, E is the type of even-
tualities and w is the type of possible worlds, so that stores can only contain individuals, peri-
ods of time, eventualities or worlds. But for the sake ofgenerality I'll formulate the basic theory
for azbitrary finite ~ here.
Ofcouise state changes are highly controlled and a short piece of text can only alter the values
of a few stores. We need a simple way to express the fact that two states agree up to the values of
some given stores. In particular, we want to have at our disposal a formula i[v~j that says that
all stores except v return the same value for arguments i and j. We can get such a formula in the
following way. Introduce for each a E O a constant ST(sa)r oftype (sa)t. This constant intu-
itively stands for the predicate "is a store of type sa". Now suppose that v is a term of type sa,
then we want i[ v~j to mean that (a) states i and j agree in all stores of type sc~ except possibly
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in v and that (b) i and j agree in all stores of all other types. Here is a definition that ensures
this.
DEFINTTION 1. If v is a term oftype sa ( a E ~), then i[v~j abbreviates the conjunction of
(a) dusa (( ST( sa)t u n u~ v)~ uj z ui ) and
(b) the conjunction of all t~us~ ( ST(SS ) t u-i uj- ui ) for all~ E ~-{ a}.
The denotation of ílij i [ vij is of course an equivalence relation.
T'here is an important constraint to be imposed. We want only models in which each state can
be changed ad lib. Until now there is nothing that guarantees this. For example, some of our
typed models may have only one state in their domain DS of states. In models that do not have
enough states an attempt to update a store may fail; we want to rule out such models. In fact, we
want to make sure that we can always update a store selectively with each appropriate value we
may like to. This we can do by means of the following axiom scheme.9
AX1 di~vsa~xa(STsa)tv -' .~j(i[vjj n vj - x)) forall a E O
The axiom scheme is closely connected to Goldblatt's [1987, pp. 102] requirement of `Having
Enough States' and with Janssen's `Update Postulate'. We'll refer to it as the Update Axiom
(Scheme). It follows from the axiom that not all type sa functions are stores (except in the
marginal case that Da contains only one element), since, for example, a constant function that
assigns the same value to all states cannot be updated to another value. The Update Axiom im-
poses the condition that contents ofstores may be varied at will.
Below we shall use non-logical constants (R for the point of reference, S for speech time, W
for the current world, vg vl, v2, ... for various discourse markers etc.) that are meant to refer
to stores. We call these special constants store names and we ensure that store names refer to
stores (and hence can be updated) by a simple axiom scheme.
AX2 ST(sa)t v for each store name v of type sa, for each a E O
Although two different stores may of course have the same value at a given state, we don't want
two different store names to refer to the same store. From i[ v~j we want to be able to conclude
that ui - uj if the store names u and v are syntactically different. We enforce this by demanding
that
9 Warning: some choices for 9 lead to inconsistency. For example, if we choose st-sets of states-to be an
element of ~ we're in trouble. First, we get a problem with the cardinality of the set of all states, since AX 1 now
would require that there are at least as many states as there are sets of states, which is impossible. This problem
could be circumvented by a suitable weakening of AX1: instead of requiring that stores can be updated with any
existent set we may require that stores can be updated with any set that is the value of some closed term in the lan-
guage. In applications this would be quite sufficient. The second problem is somewhat trickier. Suppose V is a
type s (st ) store name. Consider the term Ai ~ Vii. By AX I there is some j such that Vj -.ii -, Vii. This im-
mediately gives V„jj -~V„jj, a contradiction. This diagonal argument is of course strongly reminiscent of the rea-
soning used in the Liar paradox and in Russell's panidox. In this paper I evade the problem by simply not letting
any element of 6 contain an s. In a future paper I intend to tackle the problem by choosing partial type theory as
the underlying logic.
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AX3 u~ v for each two different store names u and v ofany type sa.
This is our logic ofchange: classical type theory plus our definition for i[v~j plus the three ax-
iom schemes given above. It is useful to extend the definition of i [ v~j to an arbitrary finite
number of stores: by induction define i[u~, ..., un ~j to abbreviate the fonmula .~k (i [ ul ] k n
k[ u2, ... , u„~j ). Given the Update Axiom we can infonmally paraphrase i[u~, ... , u„~j as:
`states i and j agree in all stores except possibly in ul, ..., un'.
The following fact is very useful. I call it the Unselective Binding Lemma and it has an ele-
mentary proof. Since a state can be thought of as a list of items, a quantifier over states can have
the effect ofa series of quantifications.
UNSEL.ECTIVE BINDING LEMMA.io Let u~, ..., un be store names, not necessarily of one and
the same type, let xl, ..., x~ be distinct variables, such that xk is oftype a if uk is of type sa,
let rp be a formula that does not contain j and let [ u~jrxl, ... , unjra4, ] rp stand for the
simultaneous substitution of uV for x~ and ... and u~j for xn in ~p, then:
(i) AX1-AX3 1- ~.J (i[u~, ..., un Ij n [u~jrx~, ..., u,~jrxn l9~) ~ .~x~ ... xn ~P
(ii) AXl-AX3 1- i~j (i[ur,..., ~~1 ~[u~jrxl, ..., ulj~xn ]9~) H I~x~... xn~G
4. DISCOURSE REPRESENTATION THEORY, DYNAMIC LOGIC AND TYPE THEORY
That the preceding exercise has some relevance for the dynamic interpretation of natural language
may be more easily appreciated if we consider the relation between our logic and Discourse
Representation Theory. I'll assume familiarity with DRT here, rehearsing only the basic facts.
Definition 2 below characterizes the DRT language. The expressions in this language can be di-
vided into two categories: conditions and Discourse Representation Structures (DRSs). As we
see from the first clause, the atomic formulae ofordinary predicate logic (without function sym-
bols) are conditions. The other two clauses allow us to build complex conditions and DRSs from
simpler constructs.
DEFINITION 2(DRT Syntax). I 1
i. If R is an n- ary relation constant and t~,...,tn are terms (constants or variables), then
Rt~...t„ is a condition.
If t~ and t2 are tenms then tl - t1 is a condition.
ii. If ~ and lY are DRSs then ~~, ~ v~ and ~~ Yi are conditions.
iii. If rpl,...,tpm are conditions (m Z 1) and x~,...,x~ are variables (n Z 0), then
[xl ...xn][ q~~ ,..., ~pm] is a DRS.
The language is evaluated on first-order models in the following way. Let M-(D, I) be such a
model (where D is the domain and I is the interpretation function of M). The value of a term t
in M under an assignment a, written as II t II M8, is defined as I( t ) if t is a constant and as a( t)
~ o Another form of the Lemma states the equivalence of 3j [vlj~x~, ..., unj~x~ ]q~ and 3act ... xn 4~ if q~
does not contain j.
~~ In this and the following defmition I choose the transparent format of Groenendijk 8c Stokhof [ 1991 ].
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if t is a variable. Definition 3 assigns a value II b II M in M to each condition or DRS S; the value
of a condition will be a set of assignments, the value of a DRS a binary relation between assign-
ments for M. (In the definition I suppress all superscripts M and write a[x~...x„] a' to mean
that the assignments a and a' return the same values for all variables, except possibly for
x~,...,xn).
DE~NiT1oN 3 (DRT Semantics).
i. IIRt~ ... tnll -{a I(Ilt,ll8, ... , II~IIB) E I(R)}
Ilt, - t211 ~{a I(Ilt,lla S IIt2118)}
ii. II~ ~ II
II ~ ~ ~II
II~ ~ ~II
(I [x~,...,Xn][ 4),,... r ~m} II '
{ a I~.~a'(a, a') E II ~ II }
{ a I.~a'(Ca, a') E II ~ II v (a, a') E II ~II) }
{a I da'(Ca, a') E II ~II -i ,~a"(a í a") E II ~II)}
{(a~ a') I a [ xl ...xn} a' ~ a' E I I 4~~ I I rl ... n I I ~Pm I I}
A DRS ~ is defined to be true in a model M under an assignment a iff there is some assign-
ment a' such that (a, a') E II ~ II M; a condition ~p is true in M under a iff a E II 9~ II M
Discourse Representation Theory comes with a set of construction rules that translate certain
English texts into DRSs and thus provide these texts with an interpretation (see e.g. Kamp
[ 1981 ] or Kamp 8z Reyle [to appear]). For example the DRS associated with text (2) is (3) and
the DRS connected to (4) is (5).
(2) A fanmer owns a donkey. He beats it.
(3) [x~, x~[Parmerx~, donkey xy own x2x~, beat x2x~]
(4) Every fanmer who owns a donkey beats it.
(5) [][[x~, x2][ farmer x~, donkey xy own x2ar~] ~[][beat x2ar~] ]
The following function t gives an embedding of DRT into predicate logic, essentially the one that
is discussed in Kamp 8L Reyle [to appear].
DEFINITION 4(Translating DRT into predicate logic).
i.
ii.
(Rt~ .. tn )r
( t, - t2 )r
(~ ~ )r
( ~ v ~)r





~ r v tYr
6'X~ ...Xn((4~~' n...n Q~mr) -~ Yir)
.~x~ ...Xn(~G[r n...n qvmr)
A simple induction on the complexity of DRT constructs shows that a condition or DRS b is true
in M under a ifand only if its translation Sr is. Note that the translation is sensitive to context:
the translation of a condition ~~ Y~ is not given as a function of the translations of ~ and Y!
By way of example the images under t of the DRSs (3) and (5) are given in (6) and (7).
(6) .~ar~x2 (farmer x~ n donkey x1 n own x2x~ n beat x~x~)
(7) i~x~xZ (( farmer x~ n donkey x2 n own x2ar~ )-i beat x2x~)
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We can go the other way around as well, translating predicate logic into the DRT language. The
function ~ defined here will do the job.
DEFINrrION S(Translating predicate logic into DRT).
i. (Rt~ ... t~ )' - [][Rt~ ... tn ]
( t, - t2 )' - [] [ t, - t2 l
ii. (~4~)' - [][~9~']
( 4~ v iV)' -[][9~' v W' ]
iii. (~xqv)' ~ [x][4~` v q~`]
Again it is easily seen that a formula q~ is tnie in M under a if and only if the DRS ~p' is, and
indeed that qv't is logically equivalent to q~. So in a sense, as far as truth conditions are con-
cerned, DRT is a notational variant of ordinary predicate logic. It should be observed, however,
that t in fact ignores one ofthe most important aspects ofDRT, namely its dynamic character. It
is here that DRT and predicate logic differ in expressive power. While a DRS characterizes a
(binary) relation of assignments, formulas of predicate logic take sets of assignments as their
values.
In order to compare DRT with the logical system described in the previous section I'll now
give a translation ofDRT into that system. Since the Kamp 8c Reyle function j- that we havejust
discussed is sensitive to context and loses the dynamic aspect of DRT, it is worth considering a
slightly more complicated embedding. This new translation will also generalise easier to transla-
tions ofother systems of dynamic logic into type logic.
Note that the context states that were introduced in the previous section in an obvious way cor-
respond to assignments. Even though for technical reasons we have decided to let states be
primitive objects and to let stores be functions from states to appropriate values, we can intuï-
tively view states as functions from stores to values. This inspires us to define the following
translation o from DRT into our logic. We let the translation (x„ )o of the n-th variable of the DRT
language (in some fixed ordering) be vni, where vn is the n-th store name oftype se (remember
that store names are constants) and i is the first variable of type s. The translation (c)o of any
individual constant c is just c itself. The translations of conditions and DRSs we get simply by
copying the clauses in definition 3, sending conditions to closed type st terms and DRSs to
closed terms oftype s(st) in the following way.
DEFINITION 6(Translating DRT into the Theory of Types).
i. (Rt~ ... tn )' - ~li (Rt~o... tn )
(ti - t2)o - ai(t~o - tZo)
ii. (~~)o - ~li-,.~j(~aij)
(~ v Yi)o - 1li.~j(~'ij v sY'ij)
(~ ~ ~)o - ail~j(~oij ~ .~t Yi'jk)
,..., -ill. ([x~ xnl[~P~~...,4~m])o ~1ij(1[V~,...,Vnlj n q~~oj n...n 9~mj)
Given our axioms AX1-AX3 definition 6 obviously does the same as definition 3 did, but now
via a translation into type logic. Let us apply o to the two example DRSs given above to see how
things work out. It is not difficult to see that (3) gets a translation that-after some lambda con-
versions-turns out to be equivalent to the following term.
(8) ílij(i[v~,v2~j n farmer(v~j) n donkey(v1j) n own(v11)(vv) n beat(v~j)(v~))
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This tenn denotes the relation that holds between two states if they dif~er maximally in two stores
and in the second state the value of the first store is a fanmer, while the value of the second store
is a donkey that he owns and beats. Copying the definition of truth for DRSs, let's say that an
s(st ) term ~ is true in a given state i if and only ifthere is some state j such that (i, j) is in
the denotation of ~. The set of all states i such that ~ is true in i-the content of ~-we de-
fine as the denotation of Ai~j ( ~ij ) (the domain of the relation ~). This means that the content of
(8) is the denotation of
(9) ~li.~j(i[v~,vZ~j n farmer(v~j) n donkey(v~j) n own(vzj)(v~j) n beat(vaj)(v~j)).
An application ofthe Unselective Binding lemma readily reduces this to the simpler
(10) 1li.~x~x2( farmer x~ n donkey x2 n own xzar~ n beat x2ar~),
which is just (6) preceded by a vacuous ai and which in an obvious sense gives the right truth
conditions: the text is true in all states if(6) is true, false in all states ifthis sentence is false.
We get the translation of (5) in the following way. First we note that the subDRS
[x~,x2] [ farmer xl, donkey xy own x2x~] translates as
(11) 11ij(i[vl,v~j n farmer(v~j) n donkey(v~j) n own(v~j)(v~j)),
while ( [ ][ beat x~r~])o equals ílij (i -j n beat( v~j )( v~j )). Now using clause ii. of definition 6,
doing some lambda convecsions and using predicate logic we find that (5)o is equivalent to
(12) ~lij(i - j n Vlr((i[v~,v2]k n farmer(v~ k) n donkey(v2k)
n own ( v2 k)( v~ k)) --i beat ( v2 k)( v~ k)),
which by Unselective Binding reduces to
(13) aij(i - j n i~x~x2( farmer x~ n donkey x2 n own x2ar1) -~ beat x~r~ )),
and which has the following tenm--(7) preceded by a vacuous lambda abstraction-for its con-
tent.
(14) ~lii~x~x2 (farmer xl n donkey x2 n own x~rt )-i beat x2x~ )
We thus see that it is possible to provide the DRT fragment with a semantics by replacing defini-
tion 3 by our translation of DRSs into type theory. Kamp's construction rules will then send
English discourses to DRSs, the function o sends DRSs to type logical terms and the usual inter-
pretation function for type logic sends these terms to objects in (higher on3er) models. In the next
section we'll see how we can shortcut this process by by-passing the level of DRSs and sending
English eJCpressions to logical tenms directly.
But before we do this let me discuss the semantics ofone more logical system, since we'll be
able to borrow some ideas from this logic as well. The logic that I have in mind is the Dynamic
Logic of Pratt [ 1976] (for a survey see Harel [ 1984], for a good introduction Goldblatt [ 1987],
for connections with natural language Van Benthem [ 1989] and Groenendijk 8c Stokhof [ 1991 ]).
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Dynamic Logic was set up in order to study aspects of the behaviour of (nondeterministic)
computer programs. Like the expressions of DRT the expressions of dynamic logic are of two
kinds: where DRT has conditions dynamic logic has formalae and where DRT has DRSs dy-
namic logic has progrdrns. The following definition characterizes the syntax of QDLt, a version
of Pratt's Quantificational Dynamic Logic.12
DEFINrrION 7 (QDLt Syntax).
i. If R is an n-ary relation constant and tl,...,tn are tenms, then Rt~...tn is a formula.
If tt and t2 are tenns then t~ - t2 is a formula.
1 is a formula.
ii. If ~ is a program and q~ is a fonmula then [~] tp is a formula.
iii. If x is a variable and t is a term then x:- 7 and x:- t are programs.
iv. If q~ is a fotmula then qv? is a program.
v. If ~ and Y~ are progtams then ~; Y~ is a progtatn.
Intuïtively these constructions are meant to have the following meanings:
[~] rp after every tetminating execution of ~, 4~ is true
x:- ? non-detertninistically assign some arbitrary value to x
x:- t assign the current value of t to x
test 4~: continue if q~ is true, otherwise fail
do ~ and then Yi
The meaning ofa program is viewed as a relation between (program) states, each program state
being some assignment of values to the program's variables. The idea is that a pair of program
states ~a, a') is an element of the denotation ofa given program iff starting in state a after exe-
cution the program could be in state a' . Since we study non-deterministic programs here, the bi-
nary relations under consideration need not be functions.
More fonmally, we can interpret the constructs of QDLt on first-order models M, sending
programs ~ to binary relations II ~ II of assignments and formulae ~p to sets of assignments II ~PII
in the following way.
DEFINTTION 8 (QDLt Semantics).
i. II Rt~ ... tn II -{a I CIIt~I18, ... , llt~lle) E I(R)}
- {a I (Iltlll~ - IIt1118)}- ~
-{ a I i~a'((a, s') E II ~ II -r a' E II ~PIU}
- {~a, a') I a [x] a' }
-{(a, a') I a[xl a' ~ a'(x) - Iltllg}
~ 2 I write QDLt because the definition on the one hand gives a slight extension of Quantificadonal Dynamic
Logic but on the other omits two clauses. Usually clause iv is restricted to read: if q~ is an stomic formula then
q~? is a program. Since Q~? is interpreted as a program that tests whether Q~ is true, the restriction is reasonable
on a computational interpretation. Note that our translation of DRT into QDLt given below depends on the
extension to arbitrary formulae here. The clauses that are omitted here are those for choice and iteration. My
QDLt is Grcenendijk 8c Stokhofs[1991] QDL, except for the treatment of the assignment x:- L Contrary to
what Grcenendijk 8c Stokhof assume this atomic program cannot be def'med as x:- ?; x- t? (consider x:- x,
for example).
11
iv. 119~ ?II -{(a, a) I a E 119~11}
v. II ~ ; ~II - {Ca, a~) I .~a„ ((a, a„~ E II ~II ~ (a'~ a~ ) E II ~II)}
In the last clause II ~; Y~I is defined to be the composition of the relations II ~(I and II ~II- Note that
[~] ~p is in fact a modal statement; the interpretation of ~ giving the relevant accessibility rela-
tion.
Quantificational Dynamic Logic in this formulation subsumes predicate logic. In particular, we
can consider q~ ~ yi and dxq~ to be abbreviations of [ q~?] yr and [x :- ?]4~ respectively. From
-~ and 1 we can ofcourse define all other propositional connectives in the usual way.
That the logic subsumes DRT as well we can show by interpreting conditions as if they were
abbreviations for certain QDLt formulae and DRSs as shorthand for certain programs. The fol-
lowing function ~ preserves meaning.
DEFI1vTTION 9(Tlanslaring DRT into QDLt).
i. (Rt~ ... t~ }~ - Rt~ ... tn
( t~ - t2 ); - t~ - t2
ii. (-, ~ ): - [ ~r]l
(~ v Y~~ - ~([~~]1n [Yr;ll)
(~ ~ Y~~ ~ [~~]~[Yitl-t-... 7 .- ~ .111. ( X~ ,...rxn1[~l r...,~m])t - X~ . . , ... ; X~ :- ? i ~Ik?i ... ; (pmt?
A simple induction shows that II a II - II S;II for any condition or DRS 8.
A few examples may show that analysing natural language with the help ofQDLt rather than
DRT can be advantageous. Let's consider (2) again (here given as(1S)). Its DRT rendering was
(16); the translation under ~ of this DRS is (17). This program is pretty close to the original text:
each atomic program in (17) corresponds to a word in (15) (the two random assignments match
with the indefinite articles), each word in (15), except the two pronouns, corresponds to an
atomic program in (17). Moreover, each of the two sentences in the little text matches with a
constituent of (17): the first sentence with the first five atomic programs, the second sentence
with the last one. We can get the translation of the text simply by sequencing the translations of
its constituent sentences. Here the QDLt program fares better as its DRT equivalent since (16)
cannot be split into two separate constituents.
(1 S) A farmer owns a donkey. He beats it.
(16) [x~, x2][farmerxl, donkey xy own xZarl, beat x2x~J
(17) x~ :- ? ; x2 :- ? ; Parmerx~ ? ; donkeyx2? ; own x2ar~ ? ; beat x2x1?
(18) x~ :- ? ; t'armerx~ ? ; x2 :- ? ; donkeyx1? ; own x2x~ ? ; bestx~1?
When we consider the equivalent (18) we even get a bit closer to the text since there are now con-
stituents to match the two indefinite NPs in the first sentence as well. The subprogram xt :- ?;
farmerx~ ? corresponds to a farmer and x1 :- ?; donkeyx2? to a donkey.
Thus we see that dynamic logic can sometimes keep quite near to the fonm ofan English text,
but there are also indications that we might need its greater expressibility in order to be able to
fonnalise texts correctly. Partee [ 1984], following a suggestion of Ewan Klein, uses assignments
to model the behaviour of the moving reference point in linear narrative. Partee's paper is written
in the DRT format, but strictly speaking assignments are not available within that framework.
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The idea can easily be expressed in dynamic logic however. Consider text (19), a linear narrative
in which the actions are intecpreted consecutively. It can be formalized as (20).




Here each verb is evaluated with respect to a current reference time t (for example find x3x~r
means that x~ finds x3 at reference time r). Moreover, the evaluation of each verb causes the
reference time to move forward. This is achieved by the subprogram h:- r; r:-?; h~ r?
which first assigns the value of r to a help variable h, then makes a random assignment to r,
and then tests whether the value of r is `just after' the value of h, i.e. r's original value (h ~ r
means that r is just after h); the net effect is that r is nondetenministically shifted to a place just
after its original position.13 Note that again the program can be split into parts that each corre-
spond to a sentence in the original text. If a sentence is added, the translation of the new text
simply becomes the translation of the old text sequenced with the translation of that new sen-
tence.
The following definition, a translation of QDLt into type logic, has much in common with our
translation of DRT into this logic. For each tenn t we let t a be as before.
DEFINTTION 10 (Translating QDLt into the Theory ofTypes).la
- 1li (Rtlo...tn )
z ,~i(t~o - tZo)
11i 1
~li i~j( ~~ij ~ 4~~j)
í~ij(i[vn~l)
íll.Í(1[Vnli nVj-to)
~lij (1 - J n rG~i 1
~1ij,~k ( ~~ ik n Y~~ kj )
Again the embedding truthfully mirrors the definition of the semantics of the source language
given the axoims AX 1-AX3. We say that a program Yi follows from a program ~ ifand only i f
II ~ II ~ ~~ ~~ in all models. It is not difficult to prove that Y~ follows from ~ in QDLt ifand only
if AX 1-AX3 1- dij (~~ij -i 1Y~ ij ) in our type logic.
Let us see what effect ~o has on (20). It is easily seen that its three constituent parts, (20a),
(20b) and (20~), are tcanslated to terms that are equivalent to (21), (22) and (23) respectively.
(20a) x~ :- ? ; man x~ ? ; x2 :- ? ; barx2?; enterx2ar~r? ; h :- r ; r :- ? ; h ~ r ?
(21) aij(i[v~,vyH,R],i n man(v~j) n bar(vzj) n enter(v~j)(vv)(Ri) n Hj - Ri n
Ri~ Rj)
13 For the moment we ignore that the reference point r should be situated before the point of speech. Zhis will
be taken into account in the theory that is sketched in section 7.
~ a For the translations of choice and iteration see Muskens [ 1991 ].
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(20b) x3 :- ? ; chairx3? ; Pindx~rtr? ; h :~ r ; r :- ? ; h S r ?
(22) llij(i[v~,H,R jj n chair(v31) n Rnd(v3j)(v~j)(Ri) n Hj - Ri n Ri S Rj)
(20~) sitdown xlr? ; h:a r; r:-?; h S r?
(23) ílij(i[H, R~j n sitdown(vv)(Ri) n Hj ~ Ri n Ri S Rj)
In order to obtain the complete translation of (20) we must apply clause v of definition 10 twice.
Sequencing (21) and (22) we get a term that after some tedious reductionsls turns out to be
equivalent to (24).
(24) ílij.Ttt(i[vl,vyv~,H,Rlj n man(vv) n bar(vzj) n enter(v~j)(v~j)(Ri) n
chair(v3j) n fnd(v31)(vv)tln Hj - tl n Ri S t, S Rj)
Reductions of a similar kind show that the result of sequencing (24) with (23) is equivalent to
(25).
(25) ~lij~t~t2(i[v~,vyv~,H,R lj n man(v~j) n bar(v~j) n enter(vsj)(v~j)(Ri) n
chair(v3j) n~nd(v31)(v~j)t~n sitdown(v~j)t2 n Hj - t2 n Ri S t~ S t2 S Rj)
We see the reference time Rj move forward here. Each part of the text has an input reference time
Ri and an output reference time Rj. If a sentence is linked to the right of a text, its input
reference time Ri will pick up the output reference time ofthe text, while its output reference time
Rj provides the reference time for possible continuations. The following term gives the content
of (25).16
(26) íli.~xtxZar~tlt1t3(man xl n barx2 n enterx2art (Ri ) n chairx3 n find x~rttt n sit-
downxlt2nRiSt~ St2St3)
Notice that not al] store names have disappeared. The text can only be eva]uated with respect to a
given input reference time, therefore R should appear as a parameter whose value is to be pro-
vided by the input context state.
15 Sequencing gives
~lij.~k ( i[ vt, v2,H,R ]k n man ( vt k) n bar ( v2k ) n enter ( v2k )(vtk )(Ri ) n Hk - Ri n Ri S Rk n
k I v3,H,R ]j n c6air ( v3 j) n Rnd ( v31)( vtj )(Rk) n Hj a Rk n Rk S Rj ).
Use the definition of k[ v~H,R li to write this as
.iij.~k(i[v1,v~,H,R]k n k[v~,H,R]j nman(vtj)náar(vyj)n enter(v?j)(vtj)(Ri)n Hk -Ri n
chair( v3 j) n Rnd ( v3j )(vtj)(Rk ) n Hj - Rk n Ri S Rk S Rj ).
Given our axioms this last term is equivalent to
.lij3h(i[vt,v2,v~H,Rjj n i[Rlh nman(vlj)nbar(vy)n enter(v21)(vlj)(Ri)n chair(v~j)n
find ( v31)(v~j )(Rh ) n Hj - Rh n Ri S Rh S Rj ),
which can be reduced to (24) with the help of Unselective Binding.
16 Clearly a suitable assumption on the ordering S would allow us to get rid of t3 in this term.
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S. MORE DONKEY BUSINESS
The embedding' given in the previous section shows that it possible to combine the dynamics of
Discourse Representation Theory with the logical engine behind Montague Grammar. I now want
to cash in on this insight. I'll define a little fragment ofEnglish that has possibilities for anaphoric
linkage and translate it into type logic, thus providing the fragment with a semantics. The treat-
ment will resemble the theories given by Kamp and Heim in the sense that it makes the same
predictions as these theories do, but I'll work in Montague's way and shall employ nothing be-
yond the resources of ordinary type logic and the axioms given in section 3. For the moment I
shall only consider nominal anaphora, but the treatment of temporal anaphora in section 7 below
will extend the fragment that is given here. I'll use a categorial grammar that is based on a set of
categories generated by the two following rules.
i. S and E are categories;
ii. If A and B are categories, then Arn B and B`n A are categories (n z 1).
Here S is the category of sentences (and texts). The category E dces not itself correspond to any
class of English expressions, but is used to build up complex categories that do correspond to
such classes. The notations rn and `n stand for sequences of n slashes (the possibility to have
multiple slashes will not be used until section 7). I write
N (common noun phrase) for SrE,
NP (noun phrase) for Sr (E `S ) ,
VP (verb phrase) for E `S,
TV (transitive verb phrise) for VPrNP, and
DET (determiner) for NPrN.
Table 1 below gives the lexicon of our toy grammar. Each basic expression of the fragment is
assigned to a category. From basic expressions complex expressions can be built. An expression
of category Arn B( B `n A) followed (preceded) by an expression of category B forms an
expression of category A. For example, the word a3 of category DET (defined as NPrN)
combines with the word man of category N to the phrase a3 man, which belongs to the cate-
gory NP. The word see of category TV can then combine with a3 man to the verb phrase
see a3 man. I counterfactually assume that agreement phenomena have been taken care of, so
that the combination of the NP Johnp with the verb phrase see a3 man is written as the sen-
tence Johnosees a3 man.
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Category Type Some basic expressions
VP [e ] walk, talk
N [ e] farmer, donkey, man, woman, bastard
NP [[ e]] l, you, Mary,,, John,,, it,,, he~, she„ ( n z 0)
~ [[[e]]e] own, beat, love, see
D~ [[el[ell an, every,,, the„ (n z 0)
(N`N)rVP [[e][e]e] who
S `(SrS) [[][]] and, Or, . ( the stop)
(S~S ) ~S [[J[JJ if
Table 1.
Determiners, proper names and pronouns in the fragment are randomly indexed. Coindexing is
meant to indicate the relation between a dependent ( for example an anaphoric pronoun) and its
antecedent. I assume that some fonm of the Binding Theory is used to rule out undesired coindex-
ings such as in "Johno sees himp, but I shan't take the trouble to spell out the relevant rules.
Since sentences and texts are treated as relations between states, we'll associate type s(st)
with category S. Type e is associated with category E. The type associated with a complex cat-
egory A~n B or B`n A, is ( TYP(B ),TYP(A )) , where TYP(B ) is the type associated with B
and TYP(A ) is the type associated with A. This means that an expression that seeks an expres-
sion of category B in order to combine with it into an expression of category A is linked with a
function from TYP(B ) objects to TYP(A ) objects. Thus our category-to-type rule is
i. TYP(S) - s(st); TYP(E) - e;
ii. TYP(ArnB) - TYP(B `nA) - (TYP(B),TYP(A)).
To improve readability let's write [ a~... an ] for ( a~ ( a2(... an (s (st )) . ..). The category-to-
type rule assigns the types that are listed in the second column of Table 1 to the categories listed
in the first column. A type [ a~... a~ ] can be thought of as a stack; a1 is at the top, application
(to a type a~ object) is popping the stack, abstraction is pushing it.
We now come to the translation into type theory of our little fragment of English. Expressions
of a category A will be translated into terms of type TYP(A ) by an inductive definition that
gives the translations of basic expressions and says how the translation of a complex expression
depends on the translations of its parts. This last combination rule is easily stated: if Q is a trans-
lation of the expression E of category Arn B or B`n A and if ~ translates the expression ~
of category B, then the translation of the result of combining ~ and ~ will be the term Q~ In
other words, combination will always correspond to functional application.
In the translations ofbasic expressions I shall let h, i, j, k and 1 be type s variables; x and y
type e variables; (subscripted) P a variable of type TYP( VP); Q a variable of type TYP(NP);
p and q variables of type s(st ); mary a constant oftype e; farmer and walk type et constants;
love a constant of type e( et ) and speaker, addressee and each vn store names oftype se~
Conjunction of sentences is formalised as sequencing, i.e. composition of relations. (Compare
clause v. of definition 10.)
and ~ 1lpqllij.~í (pih n qhj)
ílpq~lij.~i (pih n qhj)
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The tianslation of the indefinite determiner a„ will be a term that searches for predicates P1 and
P2 as usual. Ifparticular choices for P~ and PZ are plugged in, a program results that consists
of three parts: first a random assignment is made to vn (compare clause iii. ofdefinition 10); then
the program that is the result of applying P~ to the value of vn is carried out and after that the
result ofapplying P~ to the value of vn is executed.
a„ 11P~P21~ij~kh(i[vn ]k n P~ (vnk)kh n P2(vIIk)hj)




11x11ij(i - j n farmerx)
.1xllij (i ~j n walk x)
~Q~Y(Q~j(i - j n ownxy))
These basic translations provide us with enough material to translate our first sentences. The
reader may wish to verify e.g. that the sentence a~ farmer owns a2 donkey translates as:l~
(27) ~lij(i[v~,v21i n farmer(vlj) n donkey(vZj) n own(v2j)(vtj)).
We see here that indefinites create discourse referents. Definites, on the other hand are only able
to pick up referents. Therefore the translation ofthe determiner then, given below, differs from
the translation of a„ in that the random assignment to vn has been skipped. For the rest the
translation is similar: first the program that is the result of applying P~ to the value of vn is
carried out and then the result ofapplying P2 to the value of v~ is executed. The translations of
the proper name Maryn and the pronoun it„ involve only one predicate. The first translation can
be understood as the translation of the„ applied to the predicate `be Mary', axaij (i - j n x-
mary), and the translation of it„ can be undeistood as the translation of the„ applied to the skip





aP~lij(vni - mary n P(vni)ij)
~lPllij (P ( vni )ij )
Using these translations we find e.g. that the sentence the~ bastardbeats it2 translates as:
(28) 11ij(i - j n bastard(vl i) n bear(v2i)(v~ i)).
We can now combine the two sentences into the text a ~ fa~mer owns a2 donkey. the ~ bas-
tard beats it2, whose translation we obtain by sequencing (27) and (28). The result is (29),
which has (30) for its content.
~~ Of course donkey translates as .ix.iij (i -j n donkey x). Here and in the rest of the paper I shall adopt the
convention that a basic translation will not be explicitly given if it can easily be read off from some obvious
Paradigm case.
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(29) ~lij(i[v~,v~] j n farmer(v~j) n donkey(vZj) n own(v2j)(v~j)
n bastard ( v~j) n beat( v2j)( vl j)).
(30) ~1i.~xy(farmerx n donkeyy n own yx n bastardx n beat yx).
We see that the definites the; and it2 succeed in picking up the referents that were introduced in
the ficst sentence. On the other hand, if the; bastardbeats it2 is interpreted without a previous
introduction of the two relevant discourse referents the context must provide for them: the text
will only be true in context states i such that v~ i is a bastard that beats v2 i then. This is the
deictic use of definites.
Other modes of combination are possible as well. Let us translate the word if as follows. The
word requires two arguments p and q. If if is applied to particular p and q, a program results
that tests whether p~ q is true in the current state, continues if the answer is yes, but fails if the
answer is no (compare clause ii. of definition 6 and clause iv. of definition 10). In a similar way
the translation of or tests whether one of the disjuncts is true.
if
or
Jlpq~lij (i - j n T~h (pih -~ .~qhk))
í~pq~lij (i - j n~T1i (pih v qih ))
Plugging in (27) and (28) into the translation of if after reductions gives:
(31) J~ij(i - j n dxy((farmerx n donkeyy n ownyx) ~( bastardx n beatyx))),
the translation of if a; farmer owns a2 donkey the; bastardbeats it2.~ 8
Here too the definites succeeded in picking up the relevant discourse referents, but note that
these referents are no longer available once (31) is processed. The translation of this sentence acts
as a test ; it cannot change the value of any store but can only serve to rule out certain continua-
tions of the interpretation process. The discourse referents that were introduced by the determin-
ers a; and a~ had a limited life span, Their role was essential in obtaining a correct translation of
the sentence, but once this translation was obtained they died and could no longer be accessed.
The translation of every; farmer wh0 owns a2 dOrlkey beats it2 becomes available as
soon as we have translations for the words who and every,,. These are defined as follows.
who ~ í1P~P2~lxaij~h(P2adh n Plxhj)
every~ -~ ~lP;P2~lij(i -j n dkl((i[vn]k n P~(vnk)kl)~ ~hP2(vnk)1h))
In fact the word who dynamically conjoins two predicates and the translation of every„ is a
variation upon the translation of if. The reader is invited to check that the famous donkey sen-
tence translates as (32).
1 g Note that a sentence like Íf Mary; owns a2 donkey she~ bests Íf2 is predicted to be tnie in those states in
which the value of v~ is not Mary. This is not very satisfying; however, if we would let the sentence Maiy;
owns a2 donkey presuppose, rather than assert, the statement vli - mary, the latter statement would be a
presupposition of the whole conditional as well. In the context of this paper there is hardly any reason to develop a
full theory of presuppositions, but see Van Eijck [ 1991 ] for an approach that may well be compatible with the
present theory.
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(32) llij(i - j n T~xy((farmerx n donkeyy n own yx) ~ beatyx)).
We have seen that definites can either be used anaphorically, picking up referents that were intro-
duced earlier in the discourse, or deictically, putting restrictions on the initial context state. Here
are tr~nslations for two words that can only be used deictically.
I
you
~1P~lij(P (speaker i)ij )
í1PAij (P(addressee i )ij )
For example, the~ girl loves you is now rendered as (33), which has (34) for its content. The
context must provide a particular girl and a particulaz addressee for the text to be true or false.
(33) ~lij (i - j n girl ( vl i) n love(addressee i)( vl i))
(34) Jli(girl ( vl i) n love(addressee i)( v~ i))
6. TEMPORAL ONTOLOGY
Our models have enough structure now to get the dynamics going, but we need some more
structure to be able to interpret the English tenses. In this section I'll impose the necessazy tempo-
ral ontology. A special tense logic, or a logic with a special tense component (such as
Montague's IL) is not needed, however, since with the help of some axioms we can simply en-
sure that the ground domains of our models provide us with as much structure as is required. We
don't need a tense logic to treat the tenses, just as we don't need a dynamic logic in order to han-
dle the dynamics of language.
There aze many ways to define the necessary structure, all of them compatible with the dynam-
ics that we have introduced. Here I shall assume a rather rich ontology, consisting of possible
eventualities, periods of time and possible worlds. For each of these basic ingredients we'll
havP a spPcial gmund type; type ~ for eventualities, tvpe r for periods of time and type w for
worlds. Accordingly, the basic domain D~ will be a set of eventualities, DT will be a set ofperi-
ods and DW a set of worlds.
Let's consider periods of time. It is natural to order these by a relation of complete temporal
precedence. We use ~, a constant of type r( rt), to express this precedence relation and define
four other useful relations in temis of it. We let
t~ ~ t2 abbreviate t~t ( t2 ~ t~ t~ ~ t) n Nt( t ~ t2 -~ t ~ tl ),
t~ O t2 abbreviate ~t ( t~ t~ n t~ t2 ),
t~ ~~ t2 abbreviate T~t ( t~ ~ t-i t~ ~ t)
t~ S t2 abbreviate tl ~ t2 n~.~t3 t~ ~ t3 ~ t2.
and
The first two of these definitions are borrowed from Van Benthem [ 1983]. Note that the
definitions have as a consequence that ~, temporal inclusion, is reflexive and transitive, that O,
temporal overlap, is reflexive and symmetric and that ~~ is reflexive and transitive.
I assume the following five temporal axioms.
AX4 [~t~t~t
AXS Htl t2t3 ((t~ C t2 n t2 C t3 )~ t~ C t3 )
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AX6 dr, t2 r3 ( r, ~ r2 v r, O r2 v r2 ~ r, )
Ax7 dr, t2r3 (( r, ~ r2 n r2 ~ r, )~ r, - r2 )
AX8 6't,~t2 t! S t~ n 6't,.~t2 t2 S t,
The first two axioms simply state that temporal precedence is a strict partial order, the third says
that any two periods are comparable: either they overlap, or one of the two precedes the other.
The fourth axiom gives us antisymmetry for the inclusion relation ~, and thus makes ~ into a
partial ordering. The last axiom, which is useful for technical reasons, states that any period is
immediately followed by another and immediately preceded by one. Some elementary reasoning
shows that AXS and AX6, in conjunction with the definitions that were given above, entail
[~t~ t2 ( t, Cc t2 v tZ cc tl ).
The intuition behind AX4-AX8 is that we view periods of time as segments of a Euclidean
straight line and that we interpret ~ as `lying completely to the left of. Under this interpretation,
~ is inclusion of segments, O is having a segment in common, t, ~~ t2 means that t1 's end
point is not to the left of t, 's, and tl S t1 means that r,'s end point coincides with t2's start. The
axioms given here do not entail everything that is true under this geometrical interpretation (for
example, we cannot derive that for any two overlapping periods there is a period that is their
intersection), but I consider anything that is true under the interpretation acceptable as an axiom
for our time structures.
Eventualities differ from periods of time in several ways. Firstly, two eventualities that occur
simultaneously need not be identical, while a period is completely determined by its temporal re-
lations to other periods (AX7 ensures this). Secondly, eventualities are contingent, but periods
are not. For example, while it is completely sure now, in May, that there will be a next month of
June (a period), it is still a contingent matter whether I shall make a trip to Portugal (an eventual-
ity) in that month. The future is contingent. On the other hand, everything that has happened last
March is fixed now and can no longer be altered. Therefore, while periods are ordered as seg-
ments on a line, we may view the relation of precedence on the set of eventualities as branching
in the direction of the future. Each eventuality has a unique past, but it may have many possible
futures. Dowty [ 1979] has pointed out that we need this kind of branching if we want to avoid
the so-called Imperfective Paradox, a puzzle that arises in connection with the semantics of the
progressive. We shall deal with the progressive below and shall avoid the Imperfective Paradox
in Dowty's way.
The picture that I have in mind looks as follows.19 Periods of time are ordered like the seg-
ments ofa straight line. Eventualities have a branching ordering. We can associate with each
eventuality e the period 8e at which it takes place (hence S must be a function of type Et).
Each eventuality occurs in many possible worlds since each has many possible futures. In fact,
worlds could be construed as maximal chains (as branches) in the branching precedence ordering
ofeventualities.
~ 9 L.eonoor Oversteegen's Two Track 77ieory of Time (see Oversteegen [1989]) partly inspired me to consider






However, we shall let worlds be primitive and define the precedence relation on eventualities
with their help. Let in be a constant of type E( w t). We say that eventualities el and e2 are
comparable if and only if ~w(e~ in w n e2 in w). Each branch in the structure of eventualities






for 9e~ ~ 9e2 n~w ( e~ in w n e2 in w),
for 9e~~ 9e2 n.Tw ( el in w n e1 in w),
for 9e~ O 9e2 n.~w (el in w n e2 in w),
for Se~ ~~ Se2 n.~w (e~ in w n e2 in w), and
for 8e 1 S 9e2 n.~w (e~ in w n e2 in w).
We may also write e ~ t for 9e ~ t if e is an eventuality and t is a period, or t ~ e for
t ~ de, and we can have similar abbreviations for ~, O, ~~ and S. I write e at t for Se - t.
Note that 3w ( el in w n e2 in w) is now equivalent to e~ ~ e2 v e~ O e2 v e2 ~ e~ and to
e~ ~~ e2 v e2 ~~ el, so that these are three equivalent formulations of comparability. We im-
pose three more axioms. The first says that each eventuality occurs in some possible world; the
second that if el and e1 are comparable, eZ occurs in w, and e2's end point is not to the left of
e~'s end point, then e j occurs in w as well; the third-slightly idealizing-says that in each
world at each period oftime some eventuality takes place.
AX9 6'e ~w e in w
AX10 [~e~e1(et ~~ e2 -i 6'w(eZ in w-i et in w))
AX 11 Ht t~w~Te ( e at t n e in w)
Axiom AX 10 in fact says that the past is immutable: whatever has happened will always have
happened. It is easy to verify that the precedence relation on eventualities is a strict partial order-
ing and that any two eventualities that both precede a third are comparable. That is, the following
three sentences are now provable.
(35) i~e ~e ~ e
(36) i~eie2e3 ((e~ ~ e2 n e2 ~ e3 )-~ el ~ e3 )
(37) t~e~e2e3 ((el ~ e3 n eZ ~ e3 )~ ( e~ ~ e2 v e~ O e2 v e1 ~ e~ ))
Replace `O' in (37) by `-' and you get the usual axioms for backwards linear orderings or
branching time structures (see Thomason [ 1970]). Of course here we don't want overlap to
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imply identity, since our eventualities have duration and may occur at the same time and yet be
different.
7. TENSE
Bach [ 1983] gives a treatment of the English auxiliary within the context ofcategorial grammar.
Bach provides categorial grammars with a feature system and assumes that tenses and aspects are
functions on verb phrases (as argued for in Bach [ 1980]). Although we do not need the full so-
phistication of Bach's grammar here, we shall follow him in this last assumption and we shall
use Montague's multiple slashes to encode a rudimentary feature system. In particular, revising
the definitions given above, we shall write
N (common noun phrase) for SrE,
Vo (untensed verb phrase) for E`S,
V~ for E `Z S,
VZ for E `-~ S,
VP (tensed verb phrase) for E`4 S,
NP (noun phrase) for Sr VP,
TV (transitive verb phrase) for Vo rNP, and
DET (determiner) for NPrN.
The idea is that Vo-Vl-V2-VP fonns a`projection line' that provides for possibilities to
hook on certain temporal operators. In particular, we shall have operators for Past, Present and
Future as well as a Perfective and a Progressive operator. The following table assigns a category
to each of them. Since our category-to-type rule will remain unchanged, each of these operators
is interpreted as a function that takes predicates to predicates (type [[e ] e]}.
Category Type Basic expressions
V~rVo [[e]e] PROG
VZrV~ [[e]e] PERF
VPr V2 [[ e] e] PRES, PAST, FUT
These five temporal operators can now be used to bridge the gaps between Vo and Vl, Vl and






















t~ "DET N~ i
the, comer
In order to allow for some operators to be skipped we add the following rule to our categorial
system: any expression of category Vo belongs to category Vl as well, and any expression of
category VI belongs to category V2. As a consequence we have, for example, that (39) is gen-
erated.
It is now possible to skip PROG or PERF or both, but a choice between PAST, PRES
and FUT remains obligatory. This leaves us with twelve tenses. Of course, sentences like
Maryo PAST turn the~ Corner should not be left as they are and I assume some rules to
convert such expressions into an acceptable form (into Maryo turned the~ corner in this case).
The same rules should ensure that (say) Johno FUT PERF PROG kÍSs she4 comes out as
Johno will have been kissing her4.
Vendler [ 1967], following a tradition dating back to Aristotle, classifies predicates as states
(e.g. be drunk), activities ( walk ), accomplishments (build a house ), and achievements ( die ).
There are many semantic and syntactic tests that help us to distinguish between these categories
(see Dowty [ 1979]}. It has been observed that verbs that express accomplishments and achieve-
ments, being kinesis verbs, verbs of motion, push the point of reference forward. States and ac-
tivities, on the other hand, are assumed to leave the reference point as it is. Another difference is
that states are interpreted as including the cunent point of reference, while an event expressed by
a kinesis verb is either included in or (in our slightly simplified set-up) is equal to the reference
point.
23
These differences are formalized in the translations below. As before, we let intransitive verbs
and common nouns be translated as expressions of type [e] and transitive verbs as expressions
of type [[[e]]e],but now we make a distinction between kinesis verbs such as yawn and see
on the one hand and states such as be drunk on the other. A kinesis verb such as yawn tests
whether the subject yawns at the current reference point ( yawn xe intuitively stands for ` e is an
event of x yawning'20) and then assigns a new value to that reference point, setting it just after
its old value. A state like be drunk doesn't move the reference point, it just tests whether the
current reference point is included in an event of the subject's being drunk. Common nouns are
treated on a par with state-like verbs (`be president', for example, is a state). We let the reference






~lxílij(yawnx(Ri) n i[Rlj n Ri ~ Rj)
~lQ1~Y(Q1UrAij(seexy(Ri) n i[Rlj n Ri ~ Rj))
ax~lij.3e(i - j n drunkxe n Ri ~ e))
Ax~lij.~ e( i- j n president xe n Ri ~ e))
Here yawn and be drunk are expressions of category Vo, while see belongs to category TV
and president is an N. In order to get translations of tensed verb phrases we need at least
translations for the operators Past, Present and Future. I give them below. In these translations
the point of speech S is a store name of type sr, while W (the current world) is a store name
of type sw. Note the difierence between R and S; one store contains eventualities, the other pe-
riods of time.21
PAST ~ 1~Pí1xJ~ij (Pxij n Ri ~ Si n Ri in Wi )
PRES ~ ~lP1l~r~lij (Pxij n Ri at Si n Ri in Wi )
FUT ~ ~1 P~larl~ij(P~j n Si ~ Ri n Ri in Wi )
As is easy to see now, the translation of yawned, which we get by applying the translation of
the past tense to that of the untensed verb phrase yawn gives the term ~1xJlij (yawn x(Ri } n
i[R ~j n Ri ~ Rj n Ri ~ Si n Ri in Wi ). We also find that will be drunk translates as
~lx~lij.~e (i - j n drunk xe n Ri S e n Si ~ Ri n Ri in Wi ). The past, present and future
tenses each add an extra condition. The past requires that the current reference point is before the
point of speech, the present requires that the reference point is at speech time and the future says
that the point of reference is after speech time. In all cases the reference point is situated in the
actual world. A sentence like Maryo will be drunk, for example, makes a statement about the
actual future, not just about one ofall possible futures.
We can apply the above tense operators directly to untensed verb phrases or we may apply a
perfective or progressive operator (or both) first. I translate the last two operators as shown be-
low. The effect of PERF can be described as follows: first the reference point is non-determin-
istically set to an event that completely precedes the input reference point, then the verb is evalu-
ated, and then the reference point is reset to its old value. The effect of PROG is similar: the ref-
2 ~ Note how close this brings us to a Davidsonian event semantics. I think that a theory along the lines of
Parsons [ 19901 could easily be implemented within the present framework.
2 ~ This asymmetric treatment of point of speech and point of reference is chosen for technical convenience and
can easily be replaced by a symmetrical setup.
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erence point is non-deterministically set to an event that includes the input reference point, the
untensed verb is evaluated, and the reference point is set back again.
PERF ~ ~lPJl,ir~lij .~kl (i[ R] k n Rk ~ Ri n Pxkl n 1[ R~j n Ri - Rj)
PROG ~ ~1 P~lxílij .~kl (i[ R] k n Ri ~ Rk n P~rld n 1[ R~j n Ri - Rj )
The reader may wish to verify that e.g. the future perfect will have yawned, the result of first
applying the perfective operator to yawn and then the future tense to the result, is now translated
as in (40). We also find for example that hadbeen drunk is translated as in (42). In (41) and
(43) pictures are drawn that in an obvious way correspond to models for the results of applying
(40) and (42) to particular x, i and j. (The lower line gives the time axis while the upper line is a
possible world.)






(42) had been drunk
(43)






In a similar way we can find translations for stative and kinesis VPs in twelve tenses: Simple
Past, Simple Present, Simple Future, Past Perfect, Present Perfect, Future Perfect, Continuous
Past, Continuous Present, Continuous Future, and the Continuous forms of Past Perfect, Present
Perfect and the Future Perfect. There is of course a clear connection between our translations and
Reichenbach's temporal structures. For example, in the translation of had been drunk we rec-
ognize Reichenbach's E-R-S and will have yawned admits not only of the structure S-
E-R, but also of S, E-R and of E-S-R. In Table 2 below I have given a systematic listing
of the twelve tenses of the verb yawn that our grammar predicts, the translations it assigns to









PAST yawn ~Lr.iij (ya wn x( Ri ) n i[R ~j n Ri S Rj n Ri C Si n Ri in Wi ) E, R-S
yawned
FUTyawn AxAij (ya wn x( Ri ) n i[R ]j n Si C Ri S Rj n Ri in Wi ) S-E, R
willyawn
PRES PERFyawn .ixaij.~e ( i- j n yawn xe n e C Ri n Ri at Si n Ri in Wi ) E-R, S
has yawned
PAST PERF yawn .lxaij.~e ( i z j n yawn xe n e C Ri C Si n Ri in Wi ) E-R-S
had yawned




PRES PROG yawn Ax.lij~e ( i- j n yawn xe n Ri S e n Ri at Si n Ri in Wi )
is yawning
PAST PROG yawn Axaij.~e ( i- j n yawn xe n Ri S e n Ri C Si n Ri in Wi )
was yawning
FUT PROG yawn Axaij.~e ( i- j n yawn xe n Si C Ri S e n Ri in Wi )
will be yawning
PRES PERF PROG yawn ~lx.iij.~e~ e2 (i - j n yawn xe2 n e~ S e2 n e~ C Ri n Ri at Si n Ri in Wi )
has been yawning
PAST PERF PROG yawn .1x.1ij3e~ e2 (i - j n yawn xe2 n e~ S e2 n el ~ Ri C Si n Ri in Wi )
had been yawning
FUT PERF PROG yawn ~ixaij3e1 eZ ( i- j n yawn xeZ n e~ S e2 n el C Ri n Si C Ri n Ri in Wi )
will have been yawning
TABLE 2.
Clearly, on this account the crudest forrns of the so-calied imperfective Paradox (see ~owty
[ 1979]) are avoided. From I am crossing the2 street, for example, the future perfect I shall
have crossed the2 street will not follow.22
Note that in our approach we have reached a true synthesis between a referential and a quan-
tificational approach to the English tenses. On the one hand we have translated the expressions
given in Table 2 to closed terms of ordinary (quantificational) type logic, on the other hand
Reichenbach's point of reference is clearly recognizable. We also see that although the
Progressive and the Perfective operators are treated in tenms of movement of the point of refer-
ence, the effect is nevertheless one ofquantification over events.
A second point to note is that our treatment did not require an alteration of the category-to-type
rule. In classical Montague Semantics the transition from a purely extensional fragment to a
fiagment in which intensions and times are taken into account demands a complication of the total
set-up. In our approach this is no longer necessary. Since a state can be thought of as a list of
items, we can simply add more items to the list ifwe wish to treat more complicated fragments of
22 L.ogical consequence is inclusion of denotations. A sentence A follows from a sentence B iff in all models
the relation that is the denotation of the translation of B is contained in the relation that is the denotation of the
translation of A. An alternative would be the DRT notion of consequence where entailment is inclusion of con-
tents.
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the language. We can thus proceed in a more or less modular way, extending our treatment of
English by adding more parameters where necessary, while retaining previous analyses. For ex-
ample, the present treatment of tenses is compatible with our previous account of the semantic
behaviour of nominal anaphora and we can accept all translations given in section 5 except those
for verbs and common nouns.
It is also possible to extend our fragment with a treatment of intensional phenomena without
having to revise it. For example, we could let the following tenn be a translation for the auxiliary
may of category ( NP ` S)r VZ.
may ~ APí1Q.1ij.~kh (i ~ j n i[R, W]k n QPkh n Rk in Wk n Rk at Sk)
Some reasoning shows that, given this translation, e.g. A3 unicorn may be yawning is
rendered as in (44).
(44) A3 unicorn may be yawning
1lij,~e~e2e~x(i - j n unicorn xel n yawn xe2 n e3 ~ e~ n e3 S e1 n e3 at Si )
This is the (preferred) de dicto reading of the sentence, the reading that does not entail the exis-
tence of a unicorn in the actual world and that does not license a pronoun picking up the referent
created by the indefinite noun phrase. In order to get it we had to assign a`lifted' category to the
auxiliary may. To get a de re reading we may use one of the usual scoping mechanisms.23
Let's see how our little fragment models the consecutio temporum that is typical for linear
narrative. In (45)-(49) some sentences are given from which we shall fonn short texts; the trans-
lations are given as well. In order to facilitate comparison with Partee [ 1984], the first three sen-
tences are taken from this paper.
(45) Mary~ turned the2 corner
Jlij~e(v~i - mary n corner(v2i)e n Ri ~ e n i[R ~j n turn(v2i)(vl i)(Ri) n
Ri ~ Rj n Ri ~ Si n Ri in Wi )
(46) John3 saw her~
Jlij ( v3 i- john n i[ R~j n see ( vl i)( v3 i )(Ri ) n Rí ~ Rj n Ri ~ Si n Ri in Wi )
(47) She~ crossed the4 street
7~ij.~7e(street(vQi)e n Ri ~ e n i[Rlj n cross(v4i)(v~i)(Ri) n Ri ~ Rj n
Ri ~ Si n Ri in Wi )
(48) She~ was drunk
11 ij~e(i~ j n drunk ( v~ i)e n Ri ~ e n Ri ~ Si n Ri in Wi )
(49) John3 had seen her~
Jlij,~e ( i- j n v3i- john n e ~ Ri ~ Si n see ( vl i)( v3 i) e n Ri in Wi )
In (50) and (51) it is shown what happens if two kinesis sentences like the ones given in (45) and
(46) are chained. The first event (the turning) occurs at the original reference time. Then the ref-
2 3 It may be that some of the temporal operators discussed above need similarly `lifted' tr3nslations.
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erence time is pushed forward to a place just after its original position; this new reference time is
the time of the second event ( the seeing)24 After this the reference time is moved again, waiting
for more events to come. In ( 52) the little text is indeed continued with one more kinesis
sentence, and the process goes on: the new event is interpreted at the now current reference time
and the reference time is pushed forward again. The result can be pictured as in (53).25
(50) Maryt tumed the2 corner. Johr~ saw hert
(51)
~lij~ete2(v~ i- mary n corner(v2i)et n Ri ~ et n turn(v2i)(vl i)(Ri) n i[R~j






(52} Mary~ turned the2 corne~ John3 saw her~. She~ crossed the4 street
.1ij.~e~ eZe3e4 ( v~ i- mary n corner ( v2 i) e~ n Ri ~ el n turn ( v2 i)( vl i)(Ri ) n
i[R~j n v3i -john n see(vti)(v3i)e2 n street(v4i)e3 n e4 ~ e3 n
cross( v4 i)( vt i) e4 n Ri ~ e2 á e4 ~ Rj n e4 ~ Si n e4 in Wi )





Text (54) shows what happens if a series of kinesis sentences is interrupted by one or more
states. The first event after the interruption is interpreted to have occurred just after the last event
before the interruption. The states all include the second event. Thus Mary's turning the corner is
just before her crossing the street, but her being drunk and her being stoned take place at periods
that include at least the time ofher crossing. A possible model is given in (55).
(54) Mary~ turned the2 corner. She~ was drunk. She~ was stoned. She~ crossed
the4 street
.l ij.~e~ e2e3e4es ( v~ i- mary n corner( v2 i) e~ n Ri ~ e~ n turn ( v2 i)( v~ i)(Ri ) n
24 The relation 'just after`, S, was defined to hold between two events iff the period of time associated with the
first event immediately precedes the period associated with the second event. The result here is that the seeing must
immediately follow the turning and that in (52) below the crossing must be immediately after the seeing. In
general our account is too strict, since on the ordinary interpretation there might be short lapses of time between
turning and seeing and between seeing and crossing. Natural language is vaguer than our theory predicts it to be.
For the moment however, we may be content with the precise relation as a fust approximation to the vague one.
See Partee [ 1984] for a suggestion of Ewan Klein that e~ S e2 be interpreted as `e2 is after el and there is no
contextually relevant e3 between e~ and e2'.
2 5 In these pictures I do not draw those states that are connected to the interpretations of common nouns. The
output reference time Rj will in all cases be drawn as an eventuality occurring in Wi even if this is not enforced
by the translation of the text. The reason is that other choices for Rj wiil be ruled out by continuations of the






Something similar happens when a consecution of kinesis sentences is interrupted by one or
more perfective sentences. In (56) the crossing is again just after the turning, but the seeing is
interpreted as having occurred at some time before the crossing. (57) suggests a model.





i[R~j n street ( v4 i) e4 n es ~ e4 n drunk ( vl i)e2 n es ~ e2 n stoned ( v~ i) e3 n
es ~ e3 n cross( v4 i)( v~ i) es n Ri S es S Rj n es ~ Si n es in Wi )
drunk
ílij~ele2e3e4( vi i- mary n corner( v2 i) e~ n Ri ~ el n turn( v2 i)( v~ i)(Ri ) n
i[R~j n v3i - john n see(vli)(v3i)e2 n e1 ~ e4 n street(v4i)e3 n e4 S e3 n
cross( v4 i)( v1 i) e4 n Ri S e4 S Rj n e4 C Si n e4 in Wi )
see turn cross...~...........~~
Ri
Ri tum cross Rj
Of course, there are other ways to connect sentences besides just sequencing them. Temporal
connectives for instance provide alternative possibilities. Here are some possible translations for
the temporal connectives when, after and before. The idea of the translation of when is that
the reference point is first moved forward before antecedent and consequent are interpreted (in
that order). T'he translation of after moves the reference point forward, then interprets the
antecedent, then moves the reference point again and finishes with interpreting the consequent.
Before is somewhat more complicated. First the reference point is moved forward to a position
that need not necessarily be in the current world. The antecedent is evaluated there; but the
consequent is evaluated at a new position, which is situated between the input reference point and




~1pq~lij.~d(i[R] k n Ri ~ Rk n pkl n qlj)
Jlpq~l ij.~lh (i[R]k n pkl n 1[R]h n Ri ~ Rk ~ Rh n qhj )
~ipq.1 ij.~lh (i[R, W] k n i[R]h n pk1 n qhj n Ri ~ Rh ~ Rk )
In (58) and (60) below we work out two example sentences and in (59) and (61) we draw
pictures again that suggest possible models. As is apparent from (61) a before sentence does not
entail its antecedent.
(58) When John3 saw herl she~ crossed the4 street
~lij.~e~e2e3 ( i[R~ j n v3 i- john n see( v~ i)( v3 i) el n street( v4 i) e2 n






(60) Before John3 saw her~ she~ crossed the4 street
Aij~el e2e3( i[R lj n v3 i- john n see ( v~ i)( v3 i) e~ n street ( v4 i)e2 n
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